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Ethiopia is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change. This is because
its important economic sector, agriculture, is virtually rain-fed. The role of the
sector in the current economic structure and the potency of the anticipated bio-
physical impacts of climate change necessitates proactive adaptation in agriculture.
This, however, breeds questions of adaptation costs and adaptation finance. This
study attempts to derive plausible range of planned adaptation costs in agriculture
along with their economy-wide and regional effects in Ethiopia. It also assess the
economy-wide and regional effects of the likely options available to a government
of a least-developed country to finance adaptation in agriculture. The results show
that planned public adaptation in agriculture puts pressure on government surplus,
impedes on manufacturing and private services, and GDP of urbanized regions. As
such, it may strain the current macroeconomic endeavors of the country which puts
government driven structural transformation and reducing fiscal deficit relative to
GDP at the center. Government of Ethiopia may reconcile this by laying out in-
centives to urban agriculture and private investment in agriculture. Besides, foreign
support in the form of biotechnology transfer and debt-relief may help to control
the side effects of grants on foreign exchange market and trade balance.
JEL classification: C68, D58, H50, H60, O55, Q16, Q28, Q54, Q56, Q58, R11, R13
Keywords : Climate change, agriculture, public adaptation, CGE model, Ethiopia




1. Introduction  
Ethiopia is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change. This attributes 
to the fact that the virtually rain-fed and smallholder subsistence agriculture of 
the country (AgSS, 2014) is the main source of income and merchandise export 
earnings (NBE, 2016) and employment (NLFS, 2005; 2013; HICES, 2011). As a 
result, adaptation in agriculture is an urgent need in Ethiopia (Conway and 
Schipper, 2011; FDRE, 2011; 2015).  
However, planning and mainstreaming adaptation in a single sector (i.e. 
agriculture) to a single stressor (i.e. climate change) into the overall 
macroeconomic framework entails additional task for policy-and decision-
makers of a given country. First, planned public adaptation in agriculture entails 
incremental budgetary burden to the public sector. Despite the high anticipation, 
international climate finance for adaptation in least developed countries (LDCs) 
is inadequate and unpredictable (Adaptation Watch, 2015; UNEP, 2016). This may 
compel LDCs to look for new finance from domestic resources and earmark them 
for adaptation in agriculture and rural settlements. Among others, governments 
of LDCs may simply scale up the public spending on agriculture efficiency 
improving measures (and prepare to shoulder the resulting fiscal deficit), to 
compromise public spending on other public services, or to raise new finance by 
raising tax rates. Such decisions usually have non-negligible allocation and 
distributional effects in low-income countries. Second, public adaptation costs 
and finance for agriculture may have distributional effects among different 
regions of the country. By implication, regional effects may matter in adaptation 
policy- and decision- making process besides the economy-wide (aggregate) 
effects. The third challenge to policy-and-decision makers comes if the economy-
wide and regional effects of public adaptation are in conflict with the current and 
future macroeconomic goals of a country. For instance, it requires to figure out 
to what extent to compromise the general (medium-and long-term) goals for the 
sake of adaptation in agriculture which itself is justifiable on many grounds.  
Therefore, climate change and adaptation to climate change will require to 
go beyond the business-as-usual development planning approach. As such, it 
may be necessary to conduct an ex ante analysis of the public adaptation policy 
to climate change. Nonetheless, the topic is barely touched in the scientific 
discourse on adaptation with respect to Ethiopia in particular and to LDCs in 
general. That is where the present study aims to contribute to. It applies a method 
to derive the direct costs of adaptation in agriculture that can be taken as an 
alternative to the commonly used “experts’ opinion” approach. The study also 
attempts to identify the sectors, households, and regions that would gain or lose 
from planned public adaptation in agriculture and alternative adaptation finance 
schemes. It also combines economy-wide and regional analysis for each policy 
experiments which paints better picture for adaptation policy-and-decision 
makers.  
The general objective of this study is to assess the economy-wide and 
regional effects of government responses to anticipated impacts of climate 
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change in Ethiopia.1 It specifically intends to address two interdependent 
objectives. First, it examines the economy-wide and regional effects of planned 
public ‘full’ adaptation in agriculture. It specifically focus on the planned public 
adaptation that aims to fully neutralize agricultural productivity shocks induced 
by climate change that are discussed in Yalew et al. (2017).2 Second, following 
from the first objective, it examines the economy-wide and regional effects of 
alternative finance schemes for adaptation in agriculture. The study applies the 
static IFPRI-CGE model (Lofgren et al., 2002) calibrated to the 2005/06 Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) of Ethiopia (EDRI, 2009). We use the CGE model to 
simulate the economy-wide effects of different policy experiments. We further 
map the economy-wide effects on sectoral output into a regional module to glean 
information on the regional effects of each policy experiments. The latter is 
important to the Ethiopian context since the economic structure of some of the 
regions is significantly different from the national average while the regional 
governments primarily depend on federal government block-grants. 
 The results show that planned adaptation to anticipated agricultural 
productivity shocks due to climate change (5%, 10%, and 15%) may require to 
uplift public budget for agricultural efficiency enhancing measures by 25 % to 
100%. This results in declining government budget surplus by 32% to 173%. This 
will shift the savings adjustment burden (in order to maintain the macroeconomic 
savings-investment balance) to households, and eventually, reduces aggregate 
households’ welfare (from 0.6% to 2.7%). Like any other public services, public 
adaptation increases demand for skilled labor types which has two further 
implications. First, it implies gains to urban households which owns such factors. 
Second, it pulls factors of production, following which output from other sectors 
decline. This is reflected in declining output in manufacturing (-2% to -10%), in 
‘other’ services (-3% to -13%), and in hotels and restaurants (-1% to -6%). The 
regional projections show that urbanized regions will bear the bulk of the trade-
offs of public adaptation in agriculture. For instance, the regional effects may 
reach to -3% in Addis Ababa, and to -2% in Dire Dawa. The key insight here is 
that full public adaptation in agriculture bears residual and indirect effects 
despite it helps to avert the aggregate (such as on GDP, on total absorption) 
effects of climate change.  
This general conclusion holds true even if planned public adaptation 
spending is supplemented with new finance obtained from either domestic or 
international sources. The marginal effects of alternative adaptation finance 
schemes on GDP, compared to default scheme through government deficits, are 
insignificant. Also, the aggregate effects vary little across the schemes. However, 
the distributional effects reflected on macroeconomic components, industrial 
activities, household groups, and regions are considerable. Availability of foreign 
                                                          
1 The anticipated productivity effects of climate change in this paper refers to changes in average agricultural yields 
under future climate (2035-2065) relative to the average agricultural yields under current climate (1980-2010)) which is 
consistent with the literature (cf. Müller and Robertson, 2014; Admassu et al., 2013; World Bank, 2010a; 2010b; Nelson et 
al., 2010).  
2 The productivity effects on Ethiopian agriculture discussed in Yalew et al. (2017) are also in the range of projections in 
previous studies on the country (cf. World Bank, 2010a; Robinson et al., 2012; World Bank, 2008), on the African continent 




finance seems better for real households’ consumption. Nevertheless, adaptation 
finance as foreign grants may appreciate the real exchange rate. Consequently, 
exports will relatively be worse off. Relative to the default scheme, urban 
households are slightly worse off under taxing schemes. Raising direct (income) 
tax rates implies the worst welfare effects for urban households. Diverting 
schemes (from general public administration or public social services) would 
imply lesser distributional effects between households. However, the range of 
regional effects are yet considerable. For instance, diverting from general public 
administration implies -0.5% for Ethiopia-wide value-added GDP, but -0.1% for 
Tigray region, and -1.7% for the city of Addis Ababa.    
The remainder of the paper discuss the related literature with respect to 
adaptation in LDCs (2) and Ethiopia (3), the materials and methods of the study 
(4), the CGE model calibration and the regional projections (5), the results and 
discussions (6), and conclusions and policy implications (7).  
 
2. Adaptation as a public policy issue in LDCs 
Climate change poses palpable risks to agricultural growth (Padgham, 2009), and 
economic growth and development of many LDCs (Tanner and Horn-
Phathanotahi, 2014). Because the global warming over the next three decades is 
unavertable (Hertel and Lobell, 2014), adaptation in agriculture in LDCs is 
important (UNFCCC, 2009; Watkiss et al., 2010).  
Adaptation to climate change refers to “adjustments in ecological, social, 
or economic systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli and their 
effects” (Smit and Pilifosova, 2001, p.879). Therefore, adaptation involves 
changes in the process, practices, and structures with the aim to moderate 
potential damages (or take opportunities, if any) associated with climate change 
(IPCC, 2007). There are different ways to classify adaptation (cf. Smit and 
Pilifosova, 2001). Adaptation can be proactive (undertaken before the impacts are 
observed) or reactive (undertaken when the impacts are experienced) (IPCC, 
2007). Adaptation is also classified as autonomous (automatic or spontaneous) 
or deliberate (planned or policy) adaptation (Smit and Pilifosova, 2001; IPCC, 
2007). Autonomous adaptation refers to a non-conscious response to climate 
change triggered by ecological, market, and welfare changes (IPCC, 2007). In 
contrast, planned adaptation is a result of a deliberate policy decision “based on 
an awareness that conditions have changed or are about to change and that 
action is required to return to, maintain, or achieve a desired state” (IPCC, 2007, 
p.869).  
Deliberate and planned adaptation measures are required, especially, 
when autonomous adaptation is doomed to be inadequate. This is usually true 
in LDCs where individual agents lack the information, finance, and technology 
necessary to deal with climate change and variability. Public adaptation primarily 
aims to fill these missing adaptive capacities (Antle and Capalbo, 2010). It also 
aims to aware, trigger, and facilitate autonomous adaptation by individual 
agents. Besides, when there are multiple beneficiaries of the adaptation 
measures, then, government action is the only efficient way to undertake 
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collective adaptation (Mendelsohn, 2000). As such, the role of government in 
anticipating, planning, and preparing to climate change adaptation in LDCs is 
indispensable (Mendelsohn, 2000; Antle and Capalbo, 2010).  
The direct costs (incremental budget demands) as well as the general 
equilibrium effects are expected to be high in poor countries.3  These, however, 
will be well beyond the economic capacity of LDCs (UNEP, 2016; Tanner and 
Horn-Phathanothai, 2014; World Bank, 2010b). Therefore, climate finance and 
technology transfers from developed countries are expected to support 
measures related to climate change in LDCs (Tanner and Horn-Phathanothai, 
2014; UNFCCC, 2009). Nevertheless, the international climate finance in general 
and adaptation finance in particular are doomed as uncertain and inadequate 
(Fenton et al., 2014; Buchner et al., 2015; UNEP, 2016; Afful-Koomson, 2014; 
Westphal et al., 2015; Tanner and Horn-Phanathanothai, 2014; Nakhooda et al., 
2013).4 Generally speaking, the international climate finance lacks clear definition 
and measure (Tanner and Horn-Phanathanothai, 2014; Adaptation Watch, 2015; 
Westphal et al., 2015) and is dominated by mitigation finance (Buchner et al., 
2015; Nakhood et al., 2013; Afful-Koomson, 2014). As such, adaptation finance 
reported by developed countries overstate the real magnitude of adaptation 
finance, perhaps, four times of the actual amount (Adaptation Watch, 2015). 
There also lacks clear criteria of raising and allocating funds that entail 
operational problems related to the access and management (Tanner and Horn-
Phanathanothai, 2014; Afful-Koomson, 2014; Fenton et al., 2014; Nakhood et al., 
2013). The definition and operational problems have bred concerns over the 
amount, time, and ways of disbursing international climate (adaptation) finance 
(Tanner and Horn-Phanathanothai, 2014; CFU, 2016; Afful-Koomson, 2014; 
Adaptation Watch, 2015; Nakhood et al., 2013). Besides being insufficient, the 
adaptation finance is fragmented and not transparent (Nakhood et al., 2013; 
Adaptation Watch, 2015). Unless significant progress is made to secure new and 
additional finance for adaptation, the gap between adaptation costs and 
adaptation finance in LDCs is likely to grow substantially over the coming 
decades (UNEP, 2016). As such, developing countries in general (Adaptation 
Watch, 2015), and African countries in particular (Afful-Koomson, 2014) are 
encouraged to implement policies to mobilize adaptation finance from their 
domestic resources. The burden apparently rests on the public sector as the 
private sector’s willingness to invest in adaptation activities is limited 
(Mendelsohn, 2012).  
As such, planned adaptation may requires either new climate change 
adaptation oriented public services or additional tasks on existing climate change 
adaptation relevant public services. However, planned public adaptation efforts 
                                                          
3 Adaptation costs include costs of planning, preparing for, facilitating, and implementing adaptation measures, 
including transaction costs (IPCC, 2014; UNEP, 2016). 
4 Each year, adaptation in developing countries may cost euros 10-20 billion between 2010 and 2020 (Project Catalyst, 
2009) and USD 70-100 billion between 2010 and 2050 (World Bank, 2010b). Further, as the sum of adaptation costs is 
equal to the annual foreign aid from developed to developing countries, adaptation finance demand in developing 
countries would need doubling annual aid to developing countries (World Bank, 2010b). Some studies argue that the 
costs may go well beyond the current global estimates (cf. Fankhauser, 2010; UNEP, 2016). Currently, adaptation costs in 
developing countries are at least 2 to 3 times higher than international public finance for adaptation (UNEP, 2016). Yet, 
the costs of adaptation are likely to be two to-three times higher than current global estimates by 2030 (and potentially 
four-to-five times higher by 2050) implying a substantial adaptation finance gap in developing countries (UNEP, 2016).  
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entail measures that are more or less in economic development toolbox (McGray 
et al., 2007). In other words, planned adaptation is inextricable from other 
endeavors for economic development (Padgham, 2009; Fankhauser and 
Schmidt-Traub, 2011). Therefore, integrating and mainstreaming adaptation to 
climate change with the wider development plans and practices will yield better 
outcomes than treating as stand-alone environmental problem in LDCs 
(Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub, 2011; Tanner and Horn-Phathanothai, 2014). 
The implication is that public adaptation measures shall be built upon the 
existing sectoral and macroeconomic institutions, policies, and practices 
(Padgham, 2009; Kissinger et al., 2013; Tanner and Horn-Phathanothai, 2014). 
Accordingly, for example, adaptation in agriculture requires an extra public 
budget on top of public spending on agricultural and rural development. This 
apparently will have non-negligible economy-wide and regional effects since 




3. Planned public adaptation in Ethiopia 
The economic consequences of climate change on agriculture are paramount in 
Ethiopia (cf. Yalew et al., 2017 and references within; World Bank, 2008; 2010a). 
Consequently, government of Ethiopia puts planned public adaptation in 
agriculture as its primary response to climate change (NMA, 2007; FDRE, 2011; 
2015). The government underlines that “a major shift is needed to ensure that 
climate resilient actions in agriculture are implemented” (FDRE, 2015, p.7). The 
government commitment to adaptation in agriculture is justifiable, at least, on 
three main grounds. First, the sector is already vulnerable to the observed climate 
change trends in the second half of the twentieth century (cf. World Bank, 2006; 
Ali, 2012). Second, agriculture is the main source of employment (NLFS, 2005; 
2013), and income and merchandise export earnings (NBE, 2016). As 
consequence, climate change effects on agriculture impede the macro economy 
(cf. Yalew et al., 2017; World Bank, 2010a; Arndt et al., 2011). Third, despite the 
favorable institutional and budgetary support, the growth in the sector has been 
unsatisfactory in the past decades (BMGF, 2010; Mitik and Engida, 2013). Besides, 
government action is necessary for effective adaptation in agriculture since 
farmers in different parts of Ethiopia indicate that lack of climate information, 
extension services, irrigation, and financial capacity inhibit them to undertake 
adaptation by their own (cf. Hadgu et al., 2014; Tessema et al., 2013; Tafesse et 
al., 2013). Therefore, government’s role to expand irrigation, agricultural 
research and extension, and rural feeder road is indispensable. Government at 
different levels can also inform, induce, and facilitate autonomous adaptation by 
the farmers themselves.  
The costs of planning and implementing public adaptation in agriculture 
are considerable. For instance, the design and implementation of ten adaptation 
projects in agriculture may cost about USD 767 million (NMA, 2007). Agricultural 
adaptation that include irrigation, R&D, draining and watershed management 
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requires an extra budget of USD 68–71 million per year (Robinson et al., 2013). 
Delivering forty one agricultural adaptation measures identified and prioritized 
by FDRE (2015) may require an additional investment of USD 600 million by 2030 
from federal and regional governments, donors, and private sector. Since the 
country has put building agriculture resilience to climate change as a domestic 
priority, about 80% of this incremental budget requirement falls on the public 
sector (FDRE, 2015). Yet, public adaptation in agriculture is only part of the 
country’s climate change related actions that include mitigation, adaptation, or 
both in many sectors. As such, Ethiopia desperately needs enormous amount of 
international climate finance especially in the form of grants (Eshetu et al., 2014). 
Nonetheless, in the past years, international climate finance to Ethiopia 
was far below what is envisaged in the climate-resilient green economy strategy 
of the country (Eshetu et al., 2014; CFU, 2016). Between 2008 and 2012, the 
international support accounted for only 20% of public spending on mitigation 
and adaptation relevant measures (Eshetu et al., 2014) while only 16% of the total 
USD 123 million approved international climate finance to the country is 
disbursed in the past decade (CFU, 2016). When available, the international 
climate finance is inclined to mitigation measures (circa 60%), and what is 
allocated to adaptation measures focuses on building institutional capacity (cf. 
Eshetu et al., 2014; CFU, 2016).  
Therefore, one may contend that Government of Ethiopia shall prepare 
itself to mobilize adaptation finance for agriculture from domestic resources. The 
default option is to commit extra public spending on agriculture, and to shoulder 
the ensuing fiscal deficit. However, the government is unlikely to bear additional 
budget commitments for agriculture (BMGF, 2010) as the existing public 
expenditure structure emphasizes agriculture and rural development (MoARD, 
2010; Lanos et al., 2014) while the country desperately needs public resources to 
foster structural transformation (NPC, 2016). In addition, climate change and 
hence adaptation to climate change are overarching problems that shall not be 
left to a specific government agency and public budget account (McGray et al., 
2007; Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub, 2011). Seen from both sides, the 
government may seek for new international and domestic resources for 
adaptation in agriculture. These, among others, may include diverting from other 
public budget accounts, seeking for foreign grants, and increasing tax revenue 
which all require fiscal decisions bearing general equilibrium effects.  
To sum up, the opportunity costs of the incremental budget demand for 
adaptation in agriculture in Ethiopia may be immense, especially, compared to 
the country’ level of development (NBE, 2016), public budget scarcity (MoFED, 
2015), and strong drive to expand transport, energy, and urban infrastructure 
(NPC, 2016). The adaptation policy making process is further complicated with 
the time lag between adaptation costs (present and certain) and adaptation 
benefits (future and uncertain). Under such conditions, an ex-ante evaluation of 
public adaptation measures for agriculture is crucial. In particular, it requires to 
examine its general equilibrium and regional effects. So doing helps to get the 
glimpse of the type, size, and strength of the indirect effects of public adaptation 
costs and finance in agriculture. It helps policy makers to identify and be prepared 
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for compensation mechanisms in advance. It also hints the possible conflicts and 
synergies of planned adaptation in agriculture with the current and planned 
economic plans of the country. The questions are topical as the country is at early 
stage of planning adaptation like other developing countries.  
However, as in elsewhere, neither the micro case studies (cf. Tessema et 
al., 2013; Hadgu et al., 2014; Berhanu and Beyene, 2015) nor policy documents 
(cf. NMSA, 2001; NMA, 2007; FDRE, 2011; FDRE, 2015) in Ethiopia attempt to 
address these appealing questions. Costs of adaptation in agriculture are scantily 
researched with the exception of NMA (2007), World Bank (2010a), Robinson et 
al. (2013), and FDRE (2015). Cost estimates in NMA (2007) are based on limited 
project type measures which is difficult to integrate with the general 
macroeconomic framework. FDRE (2015) provide estimates of the direct costs of 
adaptation in agriculture leaving out the general equilibrium effects. The World 
Bank (2010a) and Robinson et al. (2013) attempt to address the general 
equilibrium effects. However, the studies do not make it explicit as to how to 
mobilize the required resources which is critical, especially, as the likelihood of 
using domestic sources of finance is high. In addition, regional effects may 
matter since not every region will benefit equally from the increased public 
spending to adaptation in agriculture.  
This study centrally aims to fill the aforementioned gaps in the literature. 
Even though the study particularly aims to examine the economy-wide and 
regional effects of alternative public adaptation costs and adaptation finance 
schemes for agriculture in Ethiopia; the conceptual framework, the methods, and 
the general conclusions can easily be adopted to other developing countries with 
similar economic and public expenditure structure.  
 
4. Materials and methods  
A list of specific adaptation measures in agriculture in a given country follows 
from the sign and the size of anticipated biophysical impacts and the aim of 
adaptation. In general, adaptation in this study is in response to anticipation of 
rising temperature and unpredictable rainfall in Ethiopia (Conway and Schipper, 
2011; IPCC, 2014; FDRE, 2011; 2015; Admassu et al., 2013), rising 
evapotranspiration and decreasing soil moisture (Admassu et al., 2013), and 
consequently, declining crop and livestock productivity (World Bank, 2010a; 
Yalew et al., 2017).  
More specifically, in this study, we focus on the case of a bundle of 
proactive planned adaptation measures, and assume to fully offset the 
anticipated agricultural productivity shocks discussed in Yalew et al. (2017) which 
are also in range of empirical studies (see Footnote 2). Government of Ethiopia 
is in charge of planning and undertaking this set of deliberate adaptation 
measures. Public adaptation is assumed to be part of the country’s development 
endeavors. Accordingly we align adaptation with the existing agricultural 
development policies, and public budget account. As such, planned public 
adaptation measures can be regarded as extra services on an existing public 




4.1. Public adaptation measures for agriculture  
We start with initial list of agricultural adaptation measures based on the general 
literature (e.g. Smit and Skinner, 2002; Kurukulasuriya and Rosenthal, 2003; 
Padgham, 2009). Then, with reference to the farm level case studies in Ethiopia 
(e.g. Tessema et al., 2013; Kassie, 2014; Berhanu and Beyene, 2015) we focus on 
measures that seem beyond farmers’ autonomous adaptive capacity. Next, to 
facilitate integrating adaptation measures with the rest of the sectoral and 
macroeconomic plans, we review a set of government sectoral and 
macroeconomic policies in general (e.g. MoFED, 2010; MoARD, 2010), and 
climate change and climate change adaptation reports/plans in particular (e.g. 
NMSA, 2001; NMA, 2007; FDRE, 2011; 2015). We further make review of various 
reports (e.g. various years Annual Agricultural Sample Survey, AgSS, reports) 
and research papers (e.g. BMGF, 2010 and background reports for it) to learn 
gaps in implementing agricultural policies in the country. We consider two 
further aspects, the ease to quantify the costs and the benefits of a specific 
adaptation measure and the economic model (i.e., a static CGE model). 
Accordingly, we review a set of agricultural economics studies that link 
agricultural development and public expenditure on agriculture (e.g. Benin et al., 
2009; Fan et al., 2000; Evenson et al., 1999).  
The procedures bring us to the final list of four broad measures which 
include irrigation and water management, agricultural research and 
development, extension services and farmers’ training, and rural feeder roads. 
Irrigation and water management as adaptation measures help to produce the 
same quantity of output (by letting farmers to produce more than once a year), 
value of output (by allowing farmers to cultivate a mix of crops), and augmenting 
labor and land productivity (by compensating soil moisture lost due to warming 
climate). Agricultural R&D helps adaptation to climate change though producing 
heat resistant and high yield crop and livestock varieties, and introducing new 
techniques of production. Agricultural extension services and trainings are 
complementary to agricultural R&D, and include government efforts to build the 
capacity of its institutions to plan and facilitate adaptation, to improve the 
effectiveness of climate relevant extension services, and to augment farmers’ 
skill to adopt climate compatible biotechnologies, to seek and understand climate 
information, to use water efficiently, and to undertake autonomous soil and water 
management practices. We assume extension services to include ‘climate 
services’ which refers to measures that are expected to influence farmers to 
adjust and make climate-sensitive decisions in crop and livestock farming such 
as scheduling (e.g. planting, harvesting operations), tactical crop management 
(e.g. fertilizer and pesticide use), crop selection (e.g. wheat or sorghum) or herd 
management, crop sequence (e.g. long or short fallows) or stocking rates, crop 
rotations (e.g. winter or summer crops), crop industry (e.g. grain or coffee; native 
or improved pastures), agricultural industry (e.g. crops or pastures), land use 
(e.g. agriculture or natural systems), and land use and adaptation of current 
systems (Meinke and Stone, 2005 cited in Tall, et al., 2014). Last, but not least, 
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since rural feeder roads contribute to agricultural productivity through input and 
output prices, diffusion and application of biotechnologies, they can be regarded 
as indirect climate change adaptation measures (Nelson et al., 2010). 
 
4.2. Direct benefits of adaptation in agriculture  
The direct benefits of each of the four adaptation measures are expressed in 
terms of their contribution to agricultural productivity with respect to public 
spending on each of them (see also Nelson et al., 2010). We collect the minimum, 
mean, and maximum elasticities from agricultural economics studies (see Table 
1 in the Appendix). Accordingly, the collective productivity effect of the 
adaptation catalog will depend on the amount of total budget available, the 
allocation across the four adaptation measures, and how effectively is the budget 
used.  
However, budget allocation to each adaptation relevant measures is not 
explicit in the public budget and in the national income accounts of Ethiopia. Yet, 
public expenditure principles for effective climate finance delivery requires ‘on-
budget’ public spending (Bird et al., 2013). It requires climate change expenditure 
to be planned and budgeted in the national budget formulation process, and to 
be executed through government systems during the budget year (Bird et al., 
2013). We have to find a way to reconcile the two issues. We blend the four 
measures to form as a ‘composite’ public services that aim to improve efficiency 
in agriculture sector. Accordingly, we create a new public service 
activity/commodity and call it as ‘public administration (agriculture)’ in modifying 
the SAM and calibrating the model.5 The procedure gives us a benchmark annual 
government expenditure on ‘adaptation relevant agricultural services’, or 
government recurrent spending on ‘public administration (agriculture)’ or 
government recurrent spending on a set of agricultural efficiency improving 
measures,  to be around 2.04 billion Ethiopian birr (or 234 million USD) in 2005/06 
prices. This amount is 13% of total government recurrent budget, 9% of total 
government spending, and 2% of GDP in 2005/06.6  
 
4.3. Direct cost of adaptation in agriculture  
Direct costs of adaptation in this study refer to the incremental public budget for 
adaptation in agriculture. Direct costs of adaptation depend on the adaptation 
policy targets and adaptation policy effectiveness. The elasticity of agricultural 
productivity with respect to change in public spending captures the adaptation 
policy effectiveness. The aim of adaptation is to fully offset the agricultural 
productivity that would have been lost due to climate change. Therefore, the 
policy (productivity) targets are reciprocals of the anticipated productivity shocks 
                                                          
5 Such public activities fall in public administration (MoFED, 2005; UNDESA, 2008). Thus, we split the public administration 
in the original SAM (EDRI, 2009) in to two: 80% (public administration, general) and 20% (public administration, 
agriculture). In segregating, we have referred to relevant policy documents on feeder roads (e.g. NBE, 2016), on irrigation 
(e.g. MoWE, 2001), agricultural extension services and R&D (e.g. Lanos et al., 2014; ReSAKSS, 2014), and total budget to 
agriculture and natural resources (MoARD, 2010; MoFED, 2014; 2015).  
6 The new public budget account roots to agriculture, natural resources, and roads in national budget accounts (cf. MoFED, 
2014; 2015). The figure seems acceptable compared to the total annual budget for agriculture and rural development 
which is estimated to be about 15% of total government spending and 5% of GDP (MoARD, 2010). 
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induced by climate change. Therefore, the shift (efficiency) parameter of 
agricultural activities, i.e., the CGE parameter on which climate change induced 
productivity shocks are commonly imposed on (cf. Yalew et al., 2017; Robinson 
et al., 2012) represents the aim of adaptation.  
In Yalew et al. (2017) we deal with climate change impacts pertaining to 
grain and livestock activities. Per contra, the elasticities from the literature links 
the adaptation measures with agriculture as a sector. Therefore, we weigh the 
grain and the livestock productivity shocks by the shares of the two activities in 
the total value-added GDP of agriculture with and without ‘fish and forest’. The 
procedure gives us agricultural productivity shocks induced by climate change to 
be in a range of -4% and -12%. However, neither the impacts nor the benefits of 
adaptation measures are confined to grain and livestock. Direct climate change 
effects to other agricultural activities (cash crops, enset crop, and even fish and 
forest) are not usually incorporated only because of lack of an applicable 
biophysical model. On the adaptation side, for instance, farmers can still use the 
same irrigation infrastructure for growing not only grains but also vegetables, 
fruits, cash crops, and enset. To account these possibilities, we enlarge the 
anticipated productivity shocks to the whole agriculture to be -5% (minimum), -
10% (mean), and -15% (maximum). By implication, the adaptation policy targets 
are to increase total agricultural productivity by 5% (minimum), 10% (medium), 
and 15% (maximum) which is in range of country, regional, and global studies. 
See, for example, Müller et al. (2011) and Knox et al. (2012) for review of climate 
change induced productivity shocks in African agriculture.  
The next is to gauge policy effectiveness uncertainty. We capture this by a 
minimum (0.05), mean (0.2), and maximum (0.35) average elasticity of 
agricultural productivity with respect to public spending on the “composite” 
agricultural efficiency improving measure (see Table 1 in the Appendix). 
However, the elasticities from the literature are commonly per a specific measure 
not per “composite” measure. Therefore, we generate thousands of random 
variables (elasticities) between the minimum and maximum of elasticities per 
each measures. Then, we compute the average of the four that yields us an 
average random elasticity with a minimum (0.05), mean (0.2), and maximum 
(0.35) values. The average elasticity of productivity, 0.2, with respect to the public 
spending on the “composite” agricultural efficiency improving measure is close 
to the elasticity (0.24) with respect to public expenditure in agriculture in Nigeria 
(Diao et al. 2010) and the elasticity (0.2) with respect to public expenditure 
irrigation and extension services in Ethiopia (Mitik and Engida, 2013).   
We can now derive the incremental public spending required for 
adaptation in agriculture or simply direct costs of adaptation in agriculture as a 
function of the elasticities (measure of effectiveness of adaptation) and the 
productivity targets (measure of anticipated impacts).  Uncertainty is inherent in 
climate change impacts as well as the effectiveness of public policies (Heal and 
Millner, 2014). To deal with the former, for a certain policy effectiveness (elasticity 
= 0.2), we derive three direct costs for each policy targets (5%, 10%, and15%), and 
to deal with the latter, for a given target of productivity (anticipated productivity 
effect= 10%), we derive three direct costs scenarios for each average elasticities 
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(0.05, 0.2, and 0.35). The procedures give us a range of 25-100% incremental 
budget relative to the benchmark budget for agricultural efficiency resulting  a 
range USD 60 to 234 million (at 2005/06 prices) of derived costs of adaptation in 
agriculture per year (see Table 2 in the Appendix). The larger the anticipated 
impacts or the lower the elasticities, the higher are the direct costs of adaptation.  
Our medium adaptation costs estimate, USD 117 million in 2005/06 prices, 
is higher than the costs (USD 68-71 million per year in 2005 prices) in Robinson 
et al. (2013) but close to the additional public expenditure (USD 132 million in 
2008 prices) required for the urgent fifteen adaptation measures in agriculture 
(FDRE, 2015). Of course, the measures in Robinson et al. (2013, p.15) do not 
include rural feeder roads while the measures in FDRE (2015, p.63) include 
measures related to biodiversity and forests. Despite the approach we pursue 
here is completely different, however, the derived direct costs are in an 
acceptable range of the two studies which derive the costs based on experts’ 
opinion (see Robinson et al., 2013, p.14; FDRE, 2015, p.48).  
 
4.4. Adaptation finance for agriculture  
In the previous section, we assume that the government will commit itself to 
allocate extra budget to agriculture and rural development and shoulder the 
ensuing deficits. However, the government of Ethiopia may not easily take 
additional budgetary commitments for agriculture (BMGF, 2010). On the one 
hand, the current budget commitments to the sector are one of the highest in 
Africa (MoARD, 2010; Lanos et al., 2014) while the country is thirst for structural 
change driven by government (NPC, 2016). The unsatisfactory growth of the 
sector (BMGF, 2010; MoARD, 2010; Mitik and Engida, 2013) itself has sparked 
policy debate on continuing the priority given to agriculture in public policies and 
budgets. In addition, as climate change is an overarching development problem 
it shall not be regarded as a stand-alone environmental problem left to a single 
government agency or budget account (McGray et al., 2007; Fankhauser and 
Schmidt-Traub, 2011). Therefore, the government may go a step further to look 
for new sources of adaptation finance. The second part of this study investigates 
this. 
We build on the previous section. The adaptation measures and aim 
remain the same. We draw and focus on the medium adaptation cost case. The 
additional spending on public administration (agriculture) services will remain 
intact and is considered as the default (benchmark) adaptation finance scheme. 
It can be regarded as adaptation finance through public deficits. To complement 
this incremental budget demand, we design six adaptation finance schemes. The 
fiscal schemes include: 1) diverting from public administration (general) services, 
2) diverting from public social services, 3) increasing transfers from the rest of 
world to government, and for a given tax base, 4) increasing direct tax rate, 5) 
increasing sales tax rate, and 6) increasing import tariffs. Therefore, the financing 
approach here is kind of ‘earmark’ financing (Bailey, 2002). Accordingly, the 
incremental revenue collected is allocated to only to adaptation in agriculture. 
Our approach is also a ‘balanced-budget’ analysis according to which “any 
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increase in expenditure has to be matched by a decrease in somewhere else or 
by a new source of tax revenue” (Stigltiz, 2000, p.509).  
The main hypothesis here is that adaptation finance schemes may dampen 
the effect of planned adaptation costs on government surplus but further distress 
the households’ welfare or pull out resources from other economic sectors 
compared to the benchmark finance scheme. Also, alternative adaptation finance 
schemes will have different implications for different sectors, household groups, 
and regions. The diverting approaches only switch budgets (or government 
consumption demand), in effect, they may bear the least general equilibrium 
effects. The international adaptation finance scheme brings an additional 
resource to the Ethiopian economy and shall dampen the effects on households’ 
welfare. Nevertheless, transfers from abroad may appreciate real exchange rate, 
and as a result affect the trade balance. Increasing direct tax rates reduce income 
left for consumption and hence impedes on households’ welfare. Increasing 
sales tax and import tariffs alter relative prices and may have distortionary 
effects. However, the strength of the distortionary effects will depend on own-
and cross-price elasticities (Stigltiz, 2000; Bailey, 2002), square of the tax rates 
(Stigltiz, 2000), and second-best efficiencies (Burfisher, 2011).7  
 
5. The CGE model calibration and Regional projections8  
5.1. The CGE model calibration  
We use the standard IFPRI-CGE model (see Lofgren et al., 2002 for details). The 
CGE model database is a modified 2005/06 SAM of Ethiopia (EDRI, 2009) that 
consists of 54 total accounts that consists of 17 activity, 18 commodity, 8 factor, 
2 household, 3 tax, and 6 other accounts (i.e., enterprise, government, ROW, 
savings-investment, changes in stock inventory, and transport and trade margin). 
The calibration of the model involves a specification of production technology 
nest, a range of elasticities, a factor market closure, and a combination of macro 
closures that are common to the empirical CGE modeling for developing 
countries (see for example, Robinson et al., 1999; Lofgren, 2001; Lofgren et al., 
2002; Hosoe et al., 2010; Diao et al., 2012). 
Each producers face a two-stage production technology nest, and are 
allowed to produce one or more commodities that can be consumed at home or 
sold at domestic or foreign markets. Households’ consumption (of both home 
and market commodities) decision is specified by Linear Expenditure System 
(LES) demand system. The value of the elasticities (of factor substitution, import 
substitutions, export transformations, and households’ demand) are borrowed 
from the related literature and can be said low in general. All factors are assumed 
to be fully employed. All categories of labor and cropland are assumed to be 
mobile across activities whereas livestock (TLU) and capital are activity-specific. 
The observed employment of each labor categories by activity are retrieved 
mainly from NLFS (2005). We use the AgSS (2006) to allocate the total agricultural 
labor employment (from NLFS, 2005) among the five agricultural activities of the 
modified SAM, and to compute TLU.  As we set the average wage rate for capital 
                                                          
7 CGE models are able to consider second-best efficiencies, i.e., increasing a specific tax rate may increase or decrease 
excess burden, if any, due to other tax types in the economy/model (Burfisher, 2011). 
8 This subsection has many similarities with Appendix 2 in Yalew et al. (2017).  
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equal to unity, the observed employment of capital in each activities is the same 
as payments from activities to factor capital in the SAM. The combination of the 
macroeconomic closures is the ‘Johansen’ type (see Lofgren et al., 2002 and 
Hosoe et al., 2010 for more). Consumer price index (CPI) is the numeraire of the 
model relative to which the CGE model determines prices.  
 
5.2. Regional projections  
It can generally be argued that the economy-wide representative agents 
(markets) fairly represent the regional representative agents (markets) in 
Ethiopia. The households’ consumption pattern (HICES, 2011) and the retail 
prices for the majority of commodities, especially of food items (NBE, 2016; CSA, 
2011; HICES, 2011) in different regions exhibit similar pattern and hovers around 
the national average. The tax rates across regions are more or less the same 
(MoFED, 2009). With the exception of Addis Ababa, the federal block-grant 
comprises about 80-95% of regional governments’ recurrent budget (MoFED, 
2009). Similarly one can assume that each of the production activities of the CGE 
model exhibit similar production technology irrespective of their regional 
location.  
Yet, the Ethiopian regions vary in terms of their level of socio-economic 
development, economic structure, and relative contribution to different national 
indicators. Under such conditions, the policy relevance of regional projections of 
policy/exogenous changes modeled at economy-wide level would be paramount. 
We pursue a top-down approach comparable to the ORANI Regional Equations 
System (ORES) for Australia (see Dixon et al., 1982 for the details).9 However, we 
do lack data and a priori knowledge of technological and institutional reasons 
which underpin the ORES-Australia (see Higgs et al., 1988 and Dixon et al., 1982 
for more) to apply to Ethiopia. Instead, we consider all regional activities to be 
‘national’ activities, and the labor intensity (and production technology) of an 
activity to be same across regions. By the virtue of ‘national’ industries 
assumption, a regional industry maintains its share in the aggregate (or Ethiopia-
wide) output of the same industry irrespective of the sales pattern of its output. 
The regional shares are exogenous and fixed (Naqvi and Peter, 1996). As such, 
the effects of a specific CGE experiment on output of an activity in a region (qar ) 
is equal to the economy-wide effect of the same simulation on the activity’s 
output (qae) (Higgs et al., 1988; Dixon et al., 1982). Mathematically,  
 qar = qae 
 
Then, for each of the eleven administrative regions, the regional 
projections involve taking the Ethiopia-wide effects on all of the economic sectors 
as ‘inputs’ to a regional module showing the economic structure of each regions. 
Then, we compute the regional effects on the region-wide value-added GDP (qAr ) 
of a specific CGE experiment as follows:  qAr  = �war. qae 
                                                          




 Where war represents the share of industry a in region r’s region-wide GDP 
at factor cost. However, with the exception of some years for Addis Ababa, there 
are no estimates of regional industries’ output and region-wide GDP in Ethiopia. 
We take a remedial measure here. We compute sectoral and region-wide GDP at 
factor cost directly from the SAM complemented with data from NLFS (2005), 
AgSS (2006), PHC (2007), and MoFED (2015).10 The share of each industries (war) 
in the region-wide GDP are given in Yalew et al. (2017, Table 1A). It captures the 
importance of a specific industry in region r. The sum of war is equal to unity. The 
economy-wide effect (qae) (see Table 3 in the Appendix) captures the sign and 
strength of a specific CGE experiment on industry a’s output.  
 
 





(A) Grain crops  (AGRAIN) |  (B) Enset crop (AENSET) |(C) Other Services (AOSER) 
 
Source: Authors’ regional module 
 
 
To sum up, our remedial approach implies the regional effects depend on 
the nature of the CGE experiment as well as the economic structure of the 
regions. In addition to being remedial to both data availability and consistency 
problems, our approach does not require to modify the CGE model as long as 




                                                          
10 Our main source of employment data in each regions per industry is NLFS (2005). We make adjustments. 
We use the population and housing census (PHC, 2007) to control for sampling bias in regional labor force 
reported in NLFS (2005). We use AgSS (2006) to adjust employment among agricultural activities. We use 
the government expenditure on agriculture and rural development in each regions (MoFED, 2015) to 
compute regional shares of public administration (agriculture) activity. To check the robustness the regional 
module, we apply the same procedures using employment data from HICES (2005) instead of NLFS (2005). 
The regional economic structure remains more or less similar except for Tigray region. Since the 
employment in manufacturing as per HICES (2005) is lower than reported in NLFS (2005), the regional 
module based on the former increases the role of agriculture in Tigray region. Despite this, there are no 
notable differences in the rest of regions. Therefore, we stick on the former as it is used for creating the 
original SAM (EDRI, 2009). Further explanation may be offered by authors upon request.  
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Figure 2: Value-added GDP of Amhara (AMH), Addis Ababa (ADD), and Ethiopia (ETH) 
 
Source: Regional module by authors 
 
 
6. Results and Discussions  
We regard adaptation in agriculture as new public policy problem. Accordingly, 
we correspond each policy experiments with parameters or exogenous variables 
related to the government account in the calibrated CGE model. The real 
government consumption of public services (general, agriculture, and social 
services), the rest of world transfer to government as well as the three tax rates 
(direct, sales, and tariff) are fixed at observed level. Since we assume ‘full’ 
adaptation to each anticipated productivity shocks in agriculture, we only need 
to model the costs of adaptation (or incremental budget demand) into the CGE 
model. The economy-wide and regional effects of the incremental budget 
demand and finance for adaptation in agriculture are given in Table 3 in the 
Appendix.  
 
6.1. Public adaptation costs  
Adaptation costs would require to increase public administration (agriculture) 
recurrent spending by 25-100% (see Table 2 in the Appendix). Public adaptation 
costs are represented by five simulations. We believe that the range of the 
simulations gauges the uncertainty in the anticipated impacts as well as the 
adaptation policy effectiveness  
The macroeconomic effects show that the total government consumption 
increases by 3 to 13% that leads to government saving to decrease by 33 to 173%. 
Falling government saving shifts the saving-adjustment burden, to maintain the 
macroeconomic saving-investment balance, to households. In effect, private 
households’ consumption declines by 0.6 to 2.7%. Therefore, increasing 
government consumption crowds out private consumption in the macro 
economy. In addition, due to the increasing government consumption of 































expands. This in turn drives up the demand (and average wage rates) especially 
for nonagricultural factors. This has two further implications. First, it increases 
non-agricultural factor income and ultimately, urban households’ real 
consumption. This, partly, offset fall in private consumption due to shifting 
saving-adjustment burden. Second, it increases cost of production in 
manufacturing and private services, and thus, lowers output and exports from 
these sectors. Consequently, aggregate exports fall by 0.5 to 2.3% following 
which imports slightly decline to satisfy the external sector closure. In balance, 
at the macroeconomic level, the decrease in private consumption and exports 
surpass the increase in total government consumption only slightly. This entails 
negligible effects of planned adaptation costs on the GDP and the total 
absorption of the economy.  
The sectoral output effects reveal the general equilibrium effects clearer. 
Public administration (agriculture) output increases by 25 to 100% which is 
directly proportional the budget uplifts. This has two further implications. On the 
one hand, it increases construction output as government activities uses 
(contracts) construction services. It also expands region-wide GDP of some 
regions (e.g. 0.7% to 2.3% in Tigray) where the benchmark share of public 
administration (agriculture) in region-wide GDP is higher than in the national 
average share in the country-wide GDP. On the other hand, it increases the 
economy-wide wage rate, especially, of the administrative labor and professional 
labor. This pulls up the cost of production in manufacturing and in private 
services. As a result, in all adaptation cost scenarios, such resource-pull effects 
are vivid on manufacturing (-2% to -10%) and ‘other’ services (-3% to -13%). 
Hotels and restaurants, transport and communications, and mining and 
quarrying are other activities that bear the indirect effects. Consequently, public 
adaptation in agriculture squeezes value-added GDP of urbanized regions like 
Addis Ababa (-0.6% to -3%) and Dire Dawa (-0.4% to -2%). The decline in the 
region-wide GDP of these two federal cities is larger than that of the national 
average (-0.1% to -0.7%) as well as in each of the other regions. Needless to say, 
the resource-pull effects get worse as the direct costs of adaptation increase. The 
resource-pull effects, especially, on manufacturing and private services imply 
that planned public adaptation in agriculture may deter structural transformation 
in the economy.  
Due to increasing households’ saving burden (i.e., due to falling 
government saving), households’ consumption budget and hence their real 
consumption decline. Per contra, the increasing demand (and hence income) for 
especially skilled labor types contributes to urban households’ wellbeing. 
Because, in Ethiopian context, such labor types are owned by urban households. 
Therefore, while the rural households’ welfare (and total households as majority 
of population lives in rural areas) decreases, and that of urban households’ 
increase. The equivalent variation (EV) for rural and urban households, 
respectively, may reach up to -5% and 4%. The welfare effects between the two 
household groups widen as adaptation costs increase. However, it shall be noted 
here that the rural households’ welfare loss due to planned adaptation costs are 
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not comparable the loss that they would have encountered due to climate change 
(see Yalew et al., 2017).   
 
6.2. Public adaptation finance  
This section is built upon the previous section. It particularly focus on the 
economy-wide and regional effects of the alternative finance schemes to 
supplement the medium adaptation costs. The medium case scenario is 
equivalent to about 50% of government spending on composite agricultural 
efficiency improving measure, to about 12% of government spending on public 
administration (general), to 18% of government spending on social services, and 
to about 27% of transfer from abroad to government of the respective benchmark 
values. For a given tax base, the government can also generate the amount 
equivalent to the medium adaptation cost by raising the exogenous rates of 
direct tax by 25% ,  of sales tax  by 32%, and of import tariffs and duties by 14%. 
We believe that the set adaptation finance experiments fairly gauge the range of 
main financing options in low-income countries. In all of the adaptation finance 
simulations, the shock to government consumption of public administration 
(agriculture or simply composite agricultural efficiency improving measure) 
remains intact. Accordingly, for example, diverting resources from public social 
services involves increasing government spending on the agricultural efficiency 
improving measure by about 50% and decreasing public demand for social 
services by about 18%: And, tariffs scheme involves increasing government 
spending on the agricultural efficiency improving measures by about 50% and 
increasing import tariff rates by about 14%.  
Therefore, results of this section shall be seen only relative to the default 
option which is increasing government spending on the agricultural efficiency 
improving measure by about 50%. The CGE results show that the marginal 
effects of the proposed finance schemes are negligible. The macroeconomic 
effects of all finance schemes on the aggregate variables (total absorption and 
GDP) hovers around -0.3%. However, different schemes influence the 
macroeconomic components differently. 
The diverting approaches involve no increase in total government 
spending. Therefore, their indirect effects on private consumption and exports 
are relatively small compared to the default finance approach. From the two 
diverting schemes, diverting from social services seems better, at least, it 
relatively dampen the burden to government saving. This may attribute to the 
fact that public social services interact with private social services compared to 
the public administration (general) which is entirely produced and virtually 
consumed by the public sector. 
 The international transfers help to dampen the pressure on public saving, 
and consequently the saving adjustment burden on households. Therefore, 
compared to others, adaptation finance from abroad scheme implies the least 
general equilibrium effects on private consumption (-0.4%). Foreign grants, 
however, may appreciate real exchange rate (expressed as local currency to 
foreign currency) that reduce exports (-3.7%) but increases imports (0.6%). 
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However, the effects on government saving will not cease (remains to be high 
around -55%). The implication is that the resource pull-effects of public 
adaptation on manufacturing and private services still inhibits the growth of total 
government revenue.  
The resource allocation effects of direct and sales tax are more or less 
similar. Except on government saving, the economy-wide effects of the two 
taxing schemes are similar to the default (or deficit) finance scheme. This mainly 
accrues to the progressive nature of the tax system in the economy, and the 
nature of the CGE experiments. Increasing direct tax rate is a lump-sum tax on 
households’ income. Similarly, the sales tax scheme can be regarded as a lump-
sum tax on households’ consumption income since we uniformly increase the 
sales tax rates in all market commodities. Besides, neither of the two tax schemes 
would cease the negative effects of public adaptation on government surplus. 
This attributes to the interaction among different tax systems in the economy. 
For instance, increasing the direct tax rates reduce income left to spend on 
consumption. Consequently, the revenue from sales tax may decline. Of course, 
the resource pull effects on the rest of the economy (as we still retain government 
spending on adaptation relevant measures) still reduce the total taxable income 
and value of market commodities. Compared to the default as well as other tax 
approaches, the macro economy is slightly worse off under tariffs scheme. Tariffs 
reduces total imports (-0.9%) which also pulls down exports (-2.4%) to satisfy the 
trade balance. Tariffs are applied only in three commodities of the CGE model 
implying the higher initial tax rates compared to sales and direct tax rates. Thus, 
the distortionary effects of tariffs are slightly worse. The total households’ 
welfare decline due to tariff scheme (-1.3%) is the worst among adaptation 
finance schemes. The distortionary effects are yet small as one of the imports 
(making up to 15% of the total imports) is entirely imported while the substitution 
elasticities for the other two commodities are low.   
Diverting budget from other public budget accounts imply least general 
equilibrium effects. This is reflected on manufacturing and ‘other’ services. The 
sectoral output effects in other adaptation finance schemes resemble the effects 
of the default scheme. This attributes to the factor reallocation effects of public 
adaptation. Particularly, the indirect effects on manufacturing (around -4%) and 
‘other’ services (around -6%) persist. Foreign grants scheme slightly worsens the 
decline in output of activities (e.g. cash crops and manufacturing) which 
contribute to exports. In contrast, it may offset some of the effects in activities 
that produce no or little tradable commodities (e.g. enset, and hotels and 
restaurants). Increasing tariffs makes imports (which are mainly manufactured) 
relatively expensive. As a result, households switch into domestic manufactured 
goods, and thus, output from manufacturing sector shall increase. This, to some 
extent, offsets the output decline (-3.4%) compared to the default financing 
option (-4.2%). Taken together, the factor-pull effects of public adaptation (and 
adaptation finance) are negative and strong on non-agricultural activities. This 
impinges on the country’s thirst for structural change. 
In terms of effects on households’ welfare, diverting approaches imply the 
least absolute value of households’ welfare effects as they do not generate new 
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employment. There is no new public spending implies two more things. First, 
factor income changes are relatively low and thus urban households’ welfare 
gain become smaller compared to the default scheme. Second, households’ 
saving burden get lesser and thus the rural households’ welfare loss become 
smaller. The international adaptation finance scheme reduces the savings burden 
on households (hence dampen rural households’ welfare loss from -2.1% to -
1.3%). As it improves urban households’ welfare gain from 1.5% to 2.2%. The 
direct tax scheme implies the worst welfare effect (-0.1%) to urban households. 
This accrue to the considerable share of income tax in the total urban 
households’ expenditure. As we pointed out earlier, sales tax approach can be 
considered as tax on households’ consumption expenditure. Neither its 
distortionary effects are expected to be high since the values of elasticities used 
in calibration are low. As a result, generally, we see little difference between the 
default and the sales tax schemes. However, urban households’ are slightly 
worse off under sales tax approach. Tariffs scheme bears the slightly the worst 
aggregate households’ welfare effects. Increasing import tariffs increases import 
prices relative to domestic prices which will increase the demand (and price) for 
domestic varieties. The combined effects result in relatively the highest 
aggregate households’ welfare loss among the adaptation finance schemes. 
Nevertheless, the distortionary effects are still little as one of the imports is 
entirely imported with no domestic substitute while the other two imports of the 
CGE model have low substitution elasticities.  
In conclusion, compared to with no finance case, simulations with 
adaptation finance imply urban households bearing the burden of adaptation 
finance. Of course, both household groups are better off under all adaptation 
costs and finance schemes if we consider the avoided welfare damages due to 
climate change (see also Yalew et al., 2017; Robinson et al., 2012; Arndt et al., 
2011; World Bank, 2010a).  
Our results on households’ welfare under taxing schemes corroborate with 
the theoretical and empirical discussion elsewhere. For instance, the marginal 
welfare costs of sales tax is lower than that of income tax and import tariffs in 
many African countries including Ethiopia (Auriol and Warlters, 2012), and that 
of import tariffs in other developing countries (Devarajan et al., 2002 cited in 
Auriol and Warlters, 2012 and Burfisher, 2011).  
The regional effects of alternative adaptation finance schemes, in general, 
resembles the regional effects of the default scheme. Diverting from public 
administration (general) budget shows negative effects to all regions. The sales 
tax scheme implies relatively narrow range of variation of the regional effects. 
Diverting public resources from public administration and social services imply 
the highest indirect effects to the urban regions. The effects of all tax schemes 
on Addis Ababa’s regional GDP are four times than the average effects on 
Ethiopia-wide GDP. As the capital city of the country, Addis Ababa is the center 
of manufacturing and commercial activities of Ethiopia, and hence represent 




7. Conclusions and policy implications  
We analyze the economy-wide and regional effects of public adaptation costs and 
finance in agriculture. The CGE simulations show that the effects on GDP and 
total absorption of the incremental budget demand for adaptation in agriculture 
are negligible. However, increasing adaptation relevant government expenditure 
reduces government surplus. This in turn shifts the saving adjustment burden to 
households, in effect, it reduces total households’ welfare. Besides, it impinges 
on structural transformation of the country because it will reduce public 
resources available for other investments such as in railways, hydropower, 
transport and communications, and industrial parks. This is particularly true in 
Ethiopia where the government regards its role in structural change as 
indispensable (NPC, 2016).  
On the other hand, increasing government spending expands public 
services that pulls factors of production, and squeezes manufacturing and private 
service, and urban GDP. This will deter the structural and spatial transformation 
in the country which already have been unsatisfactory in the last two decades 
(Dorosh and Thurlow, 2010; 2011; NPC, 2016). The effects on urban GDP may 
even have far reaching consequences. Because, barely 20% of the total 
population of the country lives in urban areas (ICPS, 2012) whilst the urban 
unemployment rate is about 17% (ICPS, 2012). In fact the policy discourse on 
urban development itself is a recent phenomenon in Ethiopia (Dorosh and 
Thurlow, 2011).  
In general, with the exception of the effects on government surplus, the 
economy-wide and regional effects of alternative adaptation finance schemes are 
similar to the case of adaptation financed by increasing spending on public 
agricultural efficiency improving services. It is also shown that the aggregate 
effects vary little across alternative finance schemes. However, different finance 
schemes do have different implications to different macroeconomic components, 
sectors, factors, households, and regions. For instance, transfers from abroad 
may appreciate real exchange rate and hence may affect exports at 
macroeconomic level. However, compared to other schemes, transfers from 
abroad imply better outcome to factor markets and households’ welfare. While 
foreign grants imply the highest, the income taxes scheme implies that lowest 
welfare gain to urban households. Rural households’ welfare loss reaches its 
minimum when resources are diverted from social services and maximum with 
tariffs scheme. Urban regions benefit least from public spending on adaptation 
in agriculture.  
The regional effects show that those least affected by climate change (see 
Yalew et al., 2017) will confront the largest burden of public adaptation in 
agriculture. We argue that regional dimension is very important in adaptation 
policy-and-decision making process. First, the main source of regional 
governments’ budget is federal block-grant (MoFED, 2009; Eshetu et al., 2014; 
Lanos et al., 2014). The existing formula, among others, takes into account the 
regions’ population and revenue generating capacity (for recurrent budget), and 
infrastructural deficiency (for capital budget) (MoFED, 2009). However, climate 
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change and planned adaptation in agriculture, may need adjustments or 
compensation mechanisms. The first may be related to how to regard adaptation 
finance for agriculture. Shall it be part of capital or recurrent budget? The second 
may be related to the set of criteria that shall be appropriate to allocate 
adaptation finance among the regions? Would it be appropriate to index to the 
exposure (which mainly depend on existing environmental conditions of the 
regions) or the economic vulnerability (which mainly depend on the relative 
contribution of climate sensitive sectors such as agriculture, and the regional 
socio-economic adaptive capacity) of the regions to climate change? In the case 
of economic vulnerability, shall it be based on sectoral effects (i.e., agricultural 
GDP) or region-wide GDP effects of climate change? Third, in using either of the 
criteria, would it be necessary to index to the impacts or potential of the regions? 
For instance, regardless of the potential effects, regions with better irrigation 
potential may receive the largest share of federal adaptation finance as block-
grant. Such allocation aims to maximize the national-wide returns of adaptation 
sponsored by the government. When we consider all of these, regional effects 
may matter even more than economy-wide effects of adaptation costs and 
finance. If considering these influence (and need adjustments) in the existing 
federal block-grant formula, planned public adaptation in a single sector may 
further have political implications.  
To sum up, the results of this study show that planned public adaptation 
in agriculture (and its costs and finance) impede on the main actor (i.e. 
government), economic sectors (i.e. manufacturing and private services), and 
regions (i.e. urban regions) of structural change in Ethiopia. The regional effects 
may have further implication for the allocation of federal block-grants among 
regional states of the country. The concern over these tradeoffs due to public 
adaptation in agriculture mounts as one considers adaptation in agriculture is 
only one among the multiple sectors such as water, energy, transport, and health 
sectors (NMSA, 2001; NMA, 2007; Robinson et al., 2013; FDRE, 2016) that need 
public support to adapt to climate change. Most importantly, as low-income 
country, the forgone opportunities of adaptation finance are high. The 
government still strives to invest in human capital, transport and communication, 
and renewable energy as they are critical for moving the Ethiopian economy 
forward (NPC, 2016; MoFED, 2010).  
Government of Ethiopia shall laying out incentives to urban agriculture 
and private investment in agriculture. This may reduce the share of smallholder 
agriculture which was the prime reason for public adaptation in agriculture. 
Besides, foreign support in the form of biotechnology transfer and debt-relief 
may help to control the side effects of grants on foreign exchange market and 
trade balance. 
Future research that fine-tune sources of adaptation finance, and that 
explicitly identify and estimate the costs of specific measures which are 
compatible with structural transformation and contribute to dampen (strengthen) 
the potential negative (positive) direct and general equilibrium effects of climate 
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Irrigation 0.03 0.09 0.20 Fan et al. (1999), Fan et al. (2000), Mitik and Egida (2013) 
Research & 
development 0.03 0.15 0.44 
Criag et al. (1997), Evenson et al. (1999), Fan et al. (1999), 
Thirtle et al. (2003), Alene and Coulibaly (2009) 
Extension, 
education, &  
training 0.00 0.10 0.71 
Evenson et al. (1999), Fan et al. (1999), Fan et al. (2000), 
Chen et al.(2008), Felloni et al. (2001), Mitik and Engida 
(2013) 
Rural roads 0.06 0.07 0.08 Fan et al. (1999), Fan et al. (2000) 
Agriculture  0.15 0.20 0.24 Benin et al. (2009), Diao et al.(2010), Mitik and Egida (2013) 
 





















Adaptation Cost Experiments  
PAG1 
10 0.05 100 2.0 234 
↑ in spending on public administration (agriculture) by 
100% 
PAG2 
10 0.20 50 1.0 117 
↑ in spending on public administration (agriculture) by 
50 % 
PAG3 
10 0.35 29 0.6 68 
↑ in spending on public administration (agriculture) by 
29 % 
PAG4 
5 0.20 25 0.5 59 
↑ in spending on public administration (agriculture) by 
25 % 
PAG5 
10 0.20 50 1.0 117 
↑ in spending on public administration (agriculture) by 
50 % 
PAG6 
15 0.20 75 1.5 176 
↑ in spending on public administration (agriculture) by 
75 % 
Adaptation  Finance Experiments 
PAGGA 
10 0.20 50 1.0 117 
PAG2 + ↓ in spending on public administration (general) 
by 12% 
PAGSS 10 0.20 50 1.0 117 PAG2 + ↓ in spending on public social services by 18% 
PAGF 10 0.20 50 1.0 117 PAG2 + ↑ in foreign grants to government by 27% 
PAGD 10 0.20 50 1.0 117 PAG2 + ↑ in direct tax rate by 25% 
PAGS 10 0.20 50 1.0 117 PAG2 + ↑ in sales tax rate by 32% 
PAGT 10 0.20 50 1.0 117 PAG2 + ↑ in import tariff rate by 14% 
 
 
The required budget uplift on the composite adaptation measure or public 
administration (agriculture) (%ΔG) to meet the productivity target (i.e., to avert 
productivity shock induced by climate change, %Δα) is computed from the standard 
elasticity equation.  
 

















Without Finance With Finance 
PAG1 PAG2 PAG3 PAG4 PAG6 PAGGA PAGSS PAGF PAGD PAGS PAGT 
Macroeconomic  effects 
ABSORP Absorption  -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 
PRVCON Private cons. -2.7 -1.2 -0.7 -0.6 -1.9 -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -1.2 -1.2 -1.3 
EXPORTS Exports -2.3 -1 -0.6 -0.5 -1.6 -0.9 -0.6 -3.7 -1.3 -1.3 -2.4 
IMPORTS Imports -0.8 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.3 -0.2 0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.9 
GDPMP GDP at market prices -0.8 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
GOVCON Government cons. 12.8 6.4 3.7 3.2 9.6 0.1 -0.2 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 
GSAV Government saving -173.6 -72.5 -38.7 -32.9 -119.2 -24.4 -13 -54.5 -50.4 -50.8 -55.8 
EXR Real Exchange Rate -1.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3 -1.0 -0.4 -0.1 -1.5 -0.6 -1.2 -1.9 
Sectoral output effects 
   
AGRAIN Grain crops -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0 -0.2 0 0 0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
ACCROP Cash crops 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0 0 -1.1 0 0 -0.2 
AENSET Enset crop -1.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3 -1.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 
ALIVST Livestock 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 
AFISFOR Fish and forest -1.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3 -1.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 
AMINQ Mining and quarrying  -3.8 -1.6 -0.9 -0.7 -2.6 -1 -0.7 -1.5 -1.7 -1.5 -1.4 
ACONS Construction  0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
AMAN Manufacturing  -9.8 -4.2 -2.3 -1.9 -6.9 -2.4 -1.9 -4.4 -4 -4.1 -3.4 
ATSER Wholesale and retail -1.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3 -1.1 -0.6 -0.3 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.9 
AHSER Hotels & restaurants  -6.3 -2.7 -1.4 -1.2 -4.4 -1.3 -1.1 -1.8 -2.4 -2.6 -2.8 
ATRNCOM Transport and comm. -3.6 -1.6 -0.9 -0.8 -2.6 -1 -0.6 -1.7 -1.5 -1.4 -1.8 
AFSER Financial intermediaries  -2.8 -1.3 -0.7 -0.6 -2 -1.4 -0.1 -1.1 -1.4 -1.1 -1.3 
ARSER Real estate & renting -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
APADMN Public admin. (general) -0.1 0 0 0 -0.1 -11.9 0 0 0 0 0 
APAGRI Public admin. (agriculture) 98.9 49.4 28.7 24.7 74.2 48.5 48.5 48.5 48.5 48.5 48.5 
ASSER Social services -2.6 -1.3 -0.7 -0.6 -1.9 -1 -13.8 -1.1 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 
AOSER Other services -13.2 -6.2 -3.4 -2.9 -9.6 -3.8 -2 -5.6 -5.9 -5.8 -5.9 
GDPFC Total GDP at factor cost -0.7 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
Households’ welfare effects 
        
RURH Rural  -5.0 -2.1 -1.1 -1 -3.5 -0.9 -0.6 -1.3 -1.6 -1.9 -2.1 
URBH Urban  4.1 1.6 0.8 0.7 2.7 0.5 0.2 2.2 -0.1 1.0 1.1 
TOTAL Total -2.8 -1.2 -0.7 -0.6 -2.0 -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -1.2 -1.2 -1.3 
Regional effects 
ETH Ethiopia -0.7 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
TIG Tigray 2.3 1.3 0.8 0.7 1.8 -0.1 1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 
AFR Afar -0.8 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.9 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 
AMH Amhara -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
ORO Oromia -0.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
SOM Somali -0.7 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 
BNG Benshangul-Gumuz -0.3 0 0 0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.3 -0.1 0 0 0 
SNNP Southern NNP -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
GAM Gambela -0.5 -0.1 0 0 -0.3 -0.9 -0.6 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 
HAR Harari -0.8 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -1.7 -1.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 
ADD Addis Ababa -2.9 -1.3 -0.7 -0.6 -2.1 -1.7 -1.4 -1.3 -1.3 -1.2 -1.3 
DD Dire Dawa -2 -0.8 -0.4 -0.4 -1.4 -0.9 -0.7 -0.9 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 
Source: CGE Simulations and Regional Projections  
Notes: The CGE results are robust to ±25% of the elasticities of production (i.e., factor substitution), 
international trade (i.e., import substitution and export transformation), and household’s demand (i.e., 
income and Frisch parameter) used in the calibration.  
 
